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NOTE
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AFTER RELEASE
FROM CUSTODY: A FEDERAL MESSAGE
AND A NEW MEXICO REMEDY
While the principle of finality of judgments may be important
enough to override individual property interests, it is a pale excuse
for leaving intact an unjust criminal verdict. The incarcerated victim of an unjust conviction clearly deserves his freedom. But the
victim who has served his time is also entitled to relief-completion
of sentence does not erase the adverse effects of a felony conviction.
Former convicts may be ineligible for naturalization, military service, and certain civil rights such as voting or holding office. They
may be expelled from or denied access to such professions as law and
medicine. And they are in danger of stiff sentences for any subsequent conviction in states having recidivist statutes.'

The writ of habeas corpus originated as a remedy for unlawful
imprisonment. Under the common law a person restrained of his
liberty could petition a court for a writ of habeas corpus and thereby get a judicial determination of the legality of his restraint. A
petitioner found to be restrained without sufficient cause was entitled to immediate release. In keeping with the common law use
of the writ, our federal habeas corpus statute requires that a person
be in custody in order to petition.
As a corollary to the initial requirement of custody, the courts
traditionally have held that the writ was available only when a
ruling in the petitioner's favor would result in his immediate release
from custody. If a favorable ruling would not result in release, the
case was considered moot and thus beyond the court's jurisdiction.4
Within the last two decades there has been a growing tendency
to broaden the use of habeas corpus. This has come about largely
as a result of the United States Supreme Court's expanding interpretation of the requirements of due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The habeas corpus proceeding has become a great forum in which those who claim they were convicted
in violation of their constitutional rights may be heard.
Because the courts have become increasingly aware of the "substantial stake in the judgment of conviction that survives the satis1. 59 Yale L.J. 786, 786-87 (1950).
2. For background information on the common law writ jee I W. Bailey, Habeas
Corpus and Special Remedies, § 1-2 (1913).
3. 28 U.S.C. sec. 2241(c) (1964).
4. Sokol, A Handbook of Federal Habeas Corpus, § 6 (1965).
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faction of the sentence, ' 5 various efforts have been made to circumvent the limitations that the custody and release from custody requirements have traditionally imposed.
This Note will discuss the solutions that are being devised to
provide relief for the person who has served his sentence, yet challenges his conviction as having been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Both federal and state remedies and the relationship between the two will be considered. In discussing state remedies, New Mexico law will be examined in some detail.
I
THE CUSTODY REQUIREMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF MOOTNESS

Federal courts have been consistent in requiring that a petitioner
for a writ of habeas corpus be in custody." Custody, however, has
been found in places other than prison. In Jones v. Cunningham,
for example, the Court held that a petitioner who had been released
from prison and placed on parole was still in custody for the purpose of the habeas corpus statute. 7 On the other hand, the "moral
stigma" of a former conviction is not sufficient restraint to constitute custody ;8 nor are the civil and economic disabilities that attach
to ex-prisoners. 9
The traditional requirement that the relief granted in a habeas
corpus proceeding be release from custody' is somewhat different
from the statutory requirement that the petitioner be in custody in
order to apply. Suppose a prisoner was serving a sentence under a
conviction that was in fact unconstitutional. He could petition the
court for a writ of habeas corpus. If he were still imprisoned at the
time his petition was heard, the court would declare his conviction
illegal, he would be released from prison, his record would be
cleared and all his civil liberties would be restored. Under the old
rules, however, if he were released prior to the time his petition
came up for a final hearing, the petition would be dismissed as
moot, no relief would be granted and the petitioner would remain
an ex-convict. Thus, whether the petitioner obtained full redress of
5. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222 (1946).
6. Sokol, A Handbook of Federal Habeas Corpus, § 6 (1945).
7. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
8. St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 43 (1943).
9. United States ex rel Rivera v. Reeves, 246 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ; Miller
v. United States, 324 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1963) ; Witte v. Ferber, 219 F.2d 113 (3d
Cir. 1955).
10. This requirement was expressed in McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136-37
(1934): "The purpose of the proceeding . . . was to inquire into the legality of the
detention, and the only judicial relief authorized was the discharge of the prisoner
or his admission to bail, and that only if his detention were found to be unlawful."
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the illegal conviction depended, to a certain extent, on the length of
time it took for his petition to get through the courts-a factor
largely beyond his control."
Within the last few years, the federal courts have both broadened the relief available under the habeas corpus statute and devised an alternate remedy to provide post-conviction relief that
heretofore had been blocked by the requirement of custody and the
problem of mootness.
II
THE FEDERAL APPROACHES

In United States v. Morgan,2 decided in 1954, the Supreme
Court, in a five to four decision, revived the common law writ of
error coram nobis and gave it a significance in modern criminal
law.

1

Morgan had previously been convicted in a federal court and had
served his sentence. In a subsequent state conviction he was sentenced as a second offender. Morgan then began a series of proceedings whereby he sought to have his federal conviction declared
void on the ground that his constitutional right to counsel had been
violated. The United States Supreme Court, recognizing "respondent's uncertainty in respect to choice of remedy ' 14 held that his
petition could be designated a motion for a writ of error coram
nobis and heard on the merits. The dissent protested sharply, contending that Congress had defined the limits of post-conviction relief for federal convictions in section 2255 of the Judicial Code1"
and Congress had not seen fit "to extend the remedy there provided
11. See Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960), rev'd, 88 S. Ct. 1556 (1968) for an
example of a fact situation similar to this.
12. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
13. For background information on the writ of error coram nobis see generally
Frank, Coram Nobis (1953). Coram nobis originated as a common law writ and was
issued out of chancery to compel trial courts to correct former judgments in light
of new evidence or to consider claims that the judgment was produced by fraud. It
was introduced in the U.S. as a means of equitable relief in civil proceedings and
has had some history here as a relief in criminal cases. 80 Harv. L. R. 422 (1966).
The Court in Morgan, in discussing coram nobis stated:
While the occasions for its use were infrequent, no one doubts its availability at common law. Coram nobis has had a continuous although limited
use also in our states. ...
. . . However, we have not held [heretofore] that the writ of coram nobis
or a motion of that nature was available in the federal courts.
United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502-09 (1954) (footnotes omitted).
14. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505 (1954).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964). A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed in
the district in which the person is being detained. Because of this, federal courts
situated in the same district as a federal prison had become burdened with large
numbers of petitions. It was also difficult for these courts to obtain the sentencing
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to persons not in federal custody under the judgment attacked." u6
Subsequent federal decisions have shown that coram nobis is to be
allowed as a post-conviction remedy only if no other remedy is
available.' 7 It has been allowed not only to attack a recidivist sentence but also to recover the right to vote.' 8
The decision in Morgan, however, was not quite so broad as
might appear at first glance. Morgan only solved the problem of
how a person seeking to attack a federal conviction could avoid the
habeas corpus requirement that he be in custody under that conviction in order to do so. Nothing was decided concerning state convictions and it was left for later cases to deal with the problem of
mootness.
It was not until Carafas v. LaYallee was decided in April of
1968 that the Supreme Court finally disposed of the release-fromcustody requirement.' 9 Carafas had been incarcerated as a result of
New York State conviction. Arguing that his conviction was void
because illegally seized evidence had been used against him, Carafas
sought relief from his conviction in both state and federal courts.
After approximately seven years of complex proceedings, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear an appeal from the federal
district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Before the Court heard the appeal, Carafa's sentence ended and the
Court was forced to consider whether the case had thereby been
rendered moot.
Eight years earlier, the Court had been faced with a similar fact
situation and a similar question in Parker v. Ellis." While admitting that the petition for relief was "impressive," the Court in
Parker dismissed the appeal and, to quote the dissent, a "five year
quest for justice ... [ended] ignominiously in the limbo of moot21

ness."
The Carafas court overruled the Parker decision. In deciding the
court's records and question witnesses from the original proceeding. Largely to re-

move these administrative difficulties, see. 2255 was added to the Judicial Code in
1948. It is a statutorily compelled substitute for habeas corpus that is applicable to
federal prisoners only and is brought by motion in the sentencing court. It is designed
to be a remedy as broad as habeas corpus and it inherited many of the characteristics
of habeas corpus, for example, the requirement that the petitioner be in custody. Persons seeking the aid of the federal courts to attack a state conviction must still proceed by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See United States v. Hayman, 342
U.S. 205 (1952) ; Sokol, A Handbook of Federal Habeas Corpus, sec. 24.2-3 (1965).
16. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 519 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
17. United States ex rel Gomori v. Maroney, 196 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
18. Kyle v. United States, 288 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Cariola,
211 F. Supp. 423 (D.C.N.J. 1962), aff'd 323 F.2d 180.
19. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
20. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960), re,'d, 88 S.Ct. 1556 (1968).
21. Id. at 577 (dissenting opinion).
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case was moot, the Court discussed three related subjects that are
relevant to the theme of this Note.
First, the Court disposed of the traditional release-from-custody
requirement as concerns federal habeas corpus on the ground that
the statute does not limit the relief that may be granted to discharge
from physical custody.
Secondly, the Court held that the collateral consequences of a
conviction save a case such as Carafas from becoming moot. The
opinion pointed out that in consequence of his conviction the petitioner could not engage in certain businesses, could not serve as an
official in a labor union for a period of time, could not serve as a
juror and was deprived of his right to vote.
Finally, the Court considered the problem of habeas corpus jurisdiction, stating that the substantial issue in the case was not mootness but whether the statute defining the habeas corpus jurisdiction
of the federal courts over persons in state custody permitted jurisdiction here. The Court concluded that once the federal jurisdiction
attached in the district court while the petitioner was in custody, it
was not defeated by his subsequent release.
III
THE MEANING OF MORGAN AND CARAFAS TO THE STATES

Section 2254 of the United States Judicial Code provides that
the Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district
court may hear a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if that custody
is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.12 The statute makes federal intervention, however, conditional on the applicant's having exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the state.
This section has become a principal method by which federal
courts enforce the expanded requirements of criminal due process
on the States. Recent Supreme Court decisions have provided, in
essence, that all federal claims raised by those convicted in a state
court must be heard on their merits and adequately resolved-if the
states fail to do so, then the federal courts will.13
The Supreme Court has often prodded the states to expand their
post-conviction remedies so that federal claims can be heard ade22. 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254 (1964).

23. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). The case law and writings on the subject of federal review of state convictions by habeas corpus proceedings are vast. See 80 Harv.
L. R. 422 (1966), for a good current summary of the subject.
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quately without resort to the federal courts by way of the writ of
habeas corpus. In a recent case the Supreme Court stated:
The Court is not blind to the fact that the federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction has been a source of irritation between the federal and
state judiciaries. It has been suggested that this friction might be
ameliorated if the states would look upon our decisions in Fay v. Noia
. . . and Townsend v. Sain . . . as affording them an opportunity to
provide state proceedings direct or collateral for a full airing of
24
federal claims.
Most states have responded to the Supreme Court challenge by
either enacting new statutory remedies or by judicial expansion of
the traditional remedies of habeas corpus and coram nobis. 25 The
states have been faced with the choice of either revising their postconviction procedures or losing control of their own criminal matters. The readily available federal review of state criminal convictions and the prospect of a federal district court's reversing the
state's highest court in a habeas corpus proceeding have provided a
continuing incentive to the states to provide post-conviction remedies comparable to those available in federal courts.26
The statute that allows the federal courts to hear a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus from a person seeking to attack a state conviction, however, also requires that the state prisoner be in custody
pursuant to that conviction in order to petition. It would appear,
then, that there can be no federal habeas corpus review of a state's
decision to refuse post-conviction relief to an ex-convict who has
served his sentence. This not only precludes federal relief but also
removes the traditional incentive for the states to provide such
relief.
The Court in Carafas decided that federal jurisdiction had attached when the prisoner first petitioned the federal district court
and was not thereafter lost. In Carafas, the prisoner had exhausted
state remedies and petitioned the federal court while he was still in
custody. If a prisoner with a legitimate constitutional claim is still
in the process of exhausting his state remedies when he is released
from custody he has lost his right to petition the federal courts for
a writ of habeas corpus. The state may fail to grant relief after the
24. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 453 (1964).
25. For a summary of the various approaches of the several states, see 46 Neb.
L.R. 135 (1967).
26. For an illustrative statement of a state Attorney General on this point: see
Raper, Post Conviction Remedies, 19 Wyo. L. J. 213, 215 (1965).

27. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964).
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petitioner's release either by holding that the question is moot, or,
if the state follows Carafas and hears on the merits, by rejecting
the petitioner's contentions. In either event the petitioner is precluded from seeking federal habeas corpus review of the state determination because he did not apply to the federal court while in
custody.
The Carafas opinion discusses at some length the unfairness that
would result by refusing relief simply because the prisoner had been
released from custody before a final determination was made on his
petition:
The petitioner in this case was sentenced in 1960. He has been
attempting to litigate his constitutional claim ever since. His path
has been long-partly because of the inevitable delays in our court
processes and partly because of the requirement that he exhaust
state remedies. He should not be thwarted now and required to bear

because the
the consequences of assertedly unlawful conviction simply
28
path has been so long that he has served his sentence.

The path that Justice Fortas referred to as "so long" was the
path that started in state courts and worked its way to federal
courts. But Carafas provides relief only if the state prisoner has
come far enough along this path to reach the federal courts before
he is released from custody. Thus, the arbitrariness complained of
is still present and the state prisoner's complete relief still depends
largely on the timing of certain judicial events largely beyond his
control.
Nor may the state conviction be attacked in the federal courts on
a coram nobis theory as it is clear that only the federal sentencing
court has jurisdiction to issue such a writ. It matters not that the
state has no remedy to test the validity of sentences already served;
Congress has not vested the federal courts with coram nobis jurisdiction in connection with state convicts and the federal courts may
not exercise habeas corpus jurisdiction except in connection with a
convict in custody under the particular state sentence under attack.2 9
The relief provided in Morgan, then, cannot be extended to state
convicts by federal courts; nor is there presently the prospect of
federal intervention to encourage the states to provide that relief.
Similarly, the relief provided in Carafas can be applied to state
convicts only in certain circumstances. And yet, the message from
the Supreme Court, considering Morgan and Carafas together, is
28. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1968).
29. Stubenrouch v. Sheriff of St. Louis County, 260 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
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clear: there are many collateral consequences that survive a sentence from an illegal conviction. Whether one who has been convicted illegally seeks relief while in prison or after serving his
sentence, and whether he is a state or a federal prisoner, should not
be determinative of whether full relief is available to him. But
under present federal law, if complete relief is to be available to the
victim of an illegal state conviction, that relief, in most instances,30
must come from the states themselves, or not at all. 31
IV
STATE SOLUTIONS: A NEW MEXICO APPROACH

It is difficult to predict how the various states will react to the
Carafas decision. It is expected that since the Supreme Court relaxed the release-from-custody requirement for state prisoners
under federal habeas corpus proceedings, state courts will at least
consider doing the same with respect to their own post-conviction
remedies. The scope of federal post-conviction remedies has
changed considerably in recent years and the states have reacted
in various ways, achieving varying degrees of success. Many states
have only recently dealt with the challenge of Fay v. Noia and
Townsend v. Sain3 2 and few have provided any post-conviction
remedies that do not entail the traditional custody requirements. 3
New Mexico is one state that has specifically dealt with this problem of custody and has adopted a framework that appears adequate
for the hearing of constitutional claims made by those who are no
longer in custody. This final section, then, will evaluate the New
Mexico solution and consider the role that the state's future case
law should play to round out the remedy. It is hoped to thereby
illustrate an adequate answer to the challenge of Morgan and
Carafas.
The New Mexico constitution has long guaranteed the right of
those claiming unlawful detention to petition the state courts for a
30. It is realized that there are some channels open for access to the federal courts

for one who has been released from custody pursuant to a state conviction that he
claims was in violation of his federal rights, but these channels are difficult and uncertain. For example, one who fails to get relief from the highest court of his state
may still appeal that decision to the United States Supreme Court if he can obtain a
writ of certorari.
31. For a proposal that federal activity be greatly increased in the area of postconviction relief from state convictions where a constitutional claim is asserted, see
Mayers, Federal Review of State Convictions: The Need for Procedural Reappraisal,
34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 615 (1966).
32. See note 23 and corresponding text supra.
33. 65 Mich. L. Rev. 172 (1966).
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writ of habeas corpus, 4 but only in the last few years was the writ
expanded into a forum for hearing federal constitutional claims.35
The New Mexico legislature, however, apparently feeling that
something more than a judicial expansion of the writ was needed,
enacted a post-conviction relief statute modeled after section 2255
of the United States Judicial Code36 that went into effect in December of 1965. This statute has been incorporated as rule 93 of the
37
New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 93 has not replaced or supplanted habeas corpus, as the
state constitution forbids this, but as a practical matter, rule 93
has become the standard method for collaterally attacking criminal
convictions in New Mexico. The statute itself requires a prisoner to
proceed under rule 93 before seeking a writ of habeas corpus unless
it appears that the remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his dentention. Like its federal counterpart, it was intended to be a remedy at least as broad as habeas corpus and the
procedure resembles habeas corpus in many respects. 38 The most
notable difference is that a motion under rule 93 is brought in the
34. N.M. Const. art. II, sec. 7.
35. The N.M. statute on habeas corpus says: "the following persons are not entitled to prosecute such writ: Persons committed or detained by virtue of the final
judgment, conviction or decree of any competent tibunal . . ." N.M. Stat. Ann. sec.
22-11-2 (1953). This is quite restrictive on its face. In a 1965 case the New Mexico
Supreme Court made it clear that this statutory provision was to be interpreted liberally to provide for the hearing of constitutional claims of those incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction. The court stated: "[F]or a court to be competent, jurisdiction must be present, and that jurisdiction clearly may be lost. When certain constitutional guaranties are denied, overlooked, or omitted, the conviction or sentence
is not by a 'competent' court." Orosco v. Cox, 75 N.M. 431, 435, 405 P.2d 668, 671
(1965).
36. See note 15 supra.
37. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1 (93) (Supp. 1967). The introductory paragraph reads
as follows:
Rule 93. Remedies on motion attacking sentence.-A prisoner in custody
under sentence of a court established by the laws of New Mexico claiming
the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution of the United States, or of the Constitution or
laws of New Mexico, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose
such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized
by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
38. The New Mexico Supreme Court, in interpreting rule 93, has generally looked
to the federal court's interpretation of section 2255 of the U.S. Judicial Code. As the
N.M. court expressed it:
[W]e adopted our Rule 93 from 28 U.S.C.A. sec. 2255, and accordingly
the interpretation placed on that section by the federal courts is persuasive of
the meaning of the identical rule adopted by us. State v. Weddle, 77 N.M. 420,
423, 423 P.2d 611, 614 (1967).
Since this is so, the discussion in note 15 supra pertaining to § 2255 is illuminative
of rule 93 as well.
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sentencing court, while the habeas corpus statute requires that the
petitioner file in the district in which he is being detained.
It is clear that custody is a prerequisite for the jurisdiction of
New Mexico courts in either a habeas corpus or a rule 93 proceeding. 9 It is not so clear that release-from-custody must be the relief.
Even before rule 93, other relief had been allowed under the habeas
corpus statute despite the provision in the statute that the writ was
for obtaining relief from the imprisonment or restraint .4 ° Thus, a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus was allowed when the relief
sought was parole 4 ' even though the court had previously held that
one on parole was in custody, 42 and in Sneed v. Cox 43 the court
allowed a habeas corpus proceeding to correct the excessive part of
a sentence despite the fact that the correction did not result in
immediate release.
As for rule 93, the wording in the rule, as well as in the federal
statute on which it is patterned, is somewhat ambiguous concerning
whether release-from-custody is the only relief available. New
Mexico courts have resolved this ambiguity in favor of other relief, 44 and this seems to be the better view. 4 5
In addition, rule 93 motions are allowed for attacking a former
conviction that has been fully satisfied if that conviction later becomes the basis of a recidivist sentence; this is true even if the
former conviction was rendered by another jurisdiction, and even
if the immediate result is not release-from-custody.4 6 Although allowing the rule for such a purpose appears to violate the require39. See note 37 supra.
40. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-11-1 (1953).
41. Aragon v. Cox, 75 N.M. 537, 407 P.2d 673 (1965).
42. Leach v. Cox, 74 N.M. 143, 391 P.2d 649 (1964).
43. 74 N.M. 659, 397 P.2d 308 (1964).
44. State v. Sublett, 78 N.M. 655, 436 P.2d 515 (1968).
45. The problem arose from the wording in the statute that refers to a prisoner
"claiming the right to be released." The statute, however, mentions forms of relief
other than release; part (b) allows the court, upon a determination favorable to the
petitioner, to "discharge the prisoner or resentence him, or grant a new trial, or correct
the sentence, as may appear appropriate." This problem was discussed in Heflin v.
United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959). See especially Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in which four other judges joined. Mr. Stewart, in examining sec. 2255, could
find "not one word to indicate any intent to alter the basic principle of habeas corpus
that relief is available only to one entitled to be released from custody." 358 U.S. at
421. The problem seems to have been resolved for the federal courts in Andrews v.
United States, 373 U.S. 334 (1963), where the court held that sec. 2255 could be used to
provide a "more flexible remedy" than release from custody.
46. See, e.g., State v. Moser, 78 N.M. 212, 430 P.2d 106 (1967), and State v.
Hardy, 78 N.M. 374, 431 P.2d 752 (1967). It is interesting to contrast these New
Mexico cases with United States v. Morgan discussed earlier in the text. In Morgan
the reason why the petitioner was before the federal courts was because New York
courts would not permit him to attack the recidivist sentence he had received. United
States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 504 (1954).
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ment that the person be in custody under the sentence attacked to
make the motion initially, in theory it does not. A prisoner who
makes such a motion is, conceptually, attacking the recidivist sentence itself, for this is the sentence under which he is presently being
detained. The recidivist sentence can only stand if there was a prior
felony conviction. If it can be shown that the prior felony conviction
47
relied on was void, then the recidivist sentence itself falls.
The state courts, then, have been lenient by traditional standards
in allowing relief other than release-from-custody in post-conviction
proceedings. No New Mexico court, however, has gone so far as to
hear either a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or a rule 93
motion on the merits if the petitioner, after seeking the court's assistance, was released from custody. New Mexico, in fact, has ruled
the other way. In State ex rel Roberts v. Swope,48 the state supreme
court denied a motion for a rehearing on a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus without consideration of the merits on the ground
that the cause was moot due to the petitioner's release from custody.
It is significant that this was a 1933 case. It seems unlikely, in the
light of recent decisions, that the court would so hold today.
The State Supreme Court took a giant step in State v. Romero
where the custody limitation was met head-on. 49 Romero, long after
he had served a sentence under a state conviction, filed in the court
that had sentenced him what he denominated a "Petition for Writ
of Error Coram Nobis," contending that the judgment and sentence of the court were illegal and unconstitutional. The trial court,
though expressing some doubt concerning the propriety of the petition, heard it on its merits by agreement of the parties and denied
relief. On appeal, the supreme court dealt with the propriety of the
petition, holding that the trial court properly had jurisdiction and
properly exercised it. This decision, however, did not rest on a
coram nobis theory as the decision in Morgan had; instead, the
court concluded that coram nobis did not exist in New Mexico
under any circumstances and that rule 60(b) (4) of the New
Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure provided for such jurisdiction? °
Thus was uncovered a post-conviction remedy that did not suffer
from the jurisdictional requirement of custody. The court went on
to say that since a void conviction could not be vitalized by the
47. R. Sokol, A Handbook of Federal Habeas Corpus § 6 (1965).

48. 38 N.M. 53, 28 P.2d4 (1933).
49.

State v. Romero, 76 N.M. 449, 415 P.2d 837 (1966).

50. N.M. Stat. Ann. sec. 21-1-1 (60) (b) (1953) provides as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: . . . (4)

the judgment is void ..

This rule is identical with Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (4).
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lapse of time, there would be no limitation of time within which a
motion must be filed under 60(b) (4), despite the fact that the
rule specifies that the motion must be brought in a reasonable time."
It appears that the New Mexico court intended to adopt a
remedy in Romero that paralleled the post-conviction remedy in
Morgan.52 For this reason we must look briefly at coram nobis as a
post-conviction remedy in the federal courts before returning to
rule 60(b).
Despite the restricted use of the writ of coram nobis at common
law, federal courts after the Morgan decision have generally expanded its scope to allow the bringing of various constitutional
claims. The remedy is designed to be a complement to the remedy
provided in sec. 225553 and may be used when nothing else is available if sound reason exists for failure to seek appropriate earlier
54
relief.
The federal courts, however, have continued to echo Morgan in
allowing the writ "only under circumstances compelling such action
to achieve justice" and only for errors of the most "fundamental
character." 55 One federal court felt the writ would only issue "when
consequences collateral to the imposition of sentence are sufficiently
substantial to justify dealing with the merits"; this same court went
on to hold that the deprivation of the right to vote was sufficient to
56
meet this criterion.
In designating rule 60(b) as a means of post-conviction relief,
New Mexico appears to have a remedy that can provide at least as
51. State v. Romero, 76 N.M. 449, 454, 415 P.2d 837, 840 (1966).
52. There is good reason for this statement. The Romero opinion seems to reason
as follows:
-New Mexico rule 60(b) is patterned on federal rule 60(b).
-Both rules expressly abolish the writ of coram nobis.
-It was intended in enacting the federal rule to retain all the substantive
rights that had been protected by coram nobis.
-New Mexico rule 60(b), then, incorporates all the rights previously available under coram nobis.
-Coram nobis at common law was available to question both civil and criminal
judgments.
-It is not necessary for New Mexico to take the additional step the U.S.
Supreme Court took in Morgan when it designated coram nobis as a postconviction remedy, claiming that federal rule 60(b) had abolished coram
nobis only as to civil judgments-the same remedy has been available in
New Mexico since the adoption of rule 60(b) within the rule itself. State v.
Romero, 76 N.M. 449, 415 P.2d 837 (1966).
53. Sanchez v. Tapia, 227 F. Supp. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
54. United States ex rel Gomori v. Maroney, 196 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
55. See, e.g., Gajewski v. United States, 368 F.2d 533, 534 (8th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 913.
56. United States v. Cariola, 211 F. Supp. 423, 425 (D.C.N.J. 1962), aff'd 323 F.2d
180 (3d Cir. 1963).
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much relief as coram nobis does in the federal courts. Although the
state takes a somewhat unique position in so doing, it is by no means
an untenable one; rule 60 (b) may well prove to be a remedy superior to that of coram nobis.
It is difficult to say for sure, but it is probable that the framers
and amenders of federal rule 60(b), upon which the New Mexico
rule is patterned, did not envision the rule as a post-conviction
remedy.57 There is, however, nothing that expressly precludes that
result in either the rule's legislative history or in subsequent case
law. The Supreme Court in Morgan held that coram nobis was
available as a post-conviction remedy; the court did not hold that
rule 60 (b) was not.
A look at the four-justice dissenting opinion in Morgan sheds
considerable light on this statement. 5 The dissent points out that
rule 60(b) was considered as a possible remedy but was rejected
because the rule requires that a motion to vacate a void judgment
be brought in a reasonable time. All participating judges apparently
felt a twelve year delay was unreasonable. The dissent went on to
add:
Apparently, having once abolished the common-law writ of coram
nobis, the Court now undertakes to reestablish it under the name of
"a motion in the nature of coram nobis" in order to escape the limita-

tions laid down in Rule 60(b).59
California and Arizona, both of whom have rules similar to the
New Mexico rule,60 have also considered the question of whether
the rule applies to criminal judgments. California has held it does
not, basing the decision on a provision of the California Penal Code
57. See generally, 7 Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 502 (2d ed. 1968). "60(b)
applies only to federal district court judgments rendered in civil actions.
...
Again
on page 804 it is stated that "rule 60(b) is dealing with direct attacks upon judgments rendered by a federal district court in a civil action ... "
The advisory committee notes concerning the 1948 amendments to rule 60 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state:
If these various amendments, including principally those to Rule 60(b),
accomplish the purpose for which they are intended, the federal rules will
deal with the practice in every sort of case in which relief from final judgments is asked . . . :
3A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 488 (Advisory Committee Notes)
(1958). Although the committee did not specifically refer to criminal cases, it could
be argued that they were included in this language.
58. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
59. Id. at 518 (dissenting opinion).
60. Federal rule 60(b) was actually patterned on the California Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 473. Arizona rule 60(c) is similar to the New Mexico and federal
rule 60 (b).
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which lists the civil rules applicable to criminal proceedings.0 ' The
rule in question is not among those listed. Arizona, on the other
hand, has concluded that it does.62
A post-conviction remedy based on federal rule 60 (b), then, is
certainly a possibility for the states; but what kind of a remedy will
it be? Although there is virtually no case law in New Mexico to
indicate how. the courts will apply rule 60 (b) as a post-conviction
remedy, 8 there is good reason to believe that it will prove to be a
better approach than coram nobis.
The rule allows the court to relieve a party of a final judgment
if that judgment is void. A judgment is void within the meainng of
rule 60(b) if the court which rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the
subject matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. 4 This wording is sufficiently broad to
permit a hearing under rule 60(b) of any rights assertable under
rule 93. Thus, a person whose rights have been violated will not be
faced with a narrower remedy if he is precluded from bringing a
rule 93 motion because of the custody requirement. Even though
modern courts that allow the writ of coram nobis have not generally
felt hampered by its common law limitation, it is not at all clear
that coram nobis is quite so broad a remedy."'
Another source of confusion concerning coram nobis has been
whether it is a civil or criminal remedy when used for post-conviction relief. At common law it was a civil remedy; the court in
Morgan, however, indicated that coram nobis could be sought by a
motion in the criminal case rather than in a separate independent
proceeding,"0 and other federal courts have allowed the same. 7
There is certainly a value in retaining the civil character of postconviction remedies if for no other reason than for the sake of
consistency." The rationale underlying the civil nature of habeas
corpus was stated thusly by the Supreme Court:
61. Gonzales v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 2d 260,44 P.2d 320 (1935).
62. State v. Moreno, 102 Ariz. 399, 430 P.2d 419 (1967) ; State v. Lopez, 96 Ariz.
169, 393 P.2d 263 (1964).
63. Only one other case has been decided in New Mexico where rule 60(b) (4) was
used as a post-conviction remedy: State v. Raburn, 76 N.M. 681, 417 P.2d 813 (1966).
It is of no help in this discussion.
64. 3 Barron & Holtzoff. Federal Practice and Procedure sec. 1327 (1958).
65. 80 Harv. L. Rev. 422 (1966) ; 65 Mich. L. Rev. 172 (1966) ; 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
154 (1965).
66. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Marcello, 202 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. La. 1962).
68. Proceedings by a writ of habeas corpus and a motion under 28 U.S.C. §
2255 are civil in nature. R. Sokol, A Handbook of Federal Habeas Corpus § 2 &
24.4 (1965). New Mexico's rule 93 is also civil. State v. Weddle, 77 N.M. 420, 423
P.2d 611 (1967).
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The writ of habeas corpus is the remedy which the law gives for
the enforcement of the civil right of personal liberty. Resort to it
sometimes becomes necessary, because of what is done to enforce laws
for the punishment of crimes, but the judicial proceeding under it is
not to inquire into the criminal act which is complained of, but into
the right to liberty notwithstanding the act. Proceedings to enforce
civil rights are civil proceedings, and proceedings for the punishment
of crimes are criminal proceedings. 69

Since rule 60 (b) is clearly civil, no such confusion arises under the
New Mexico remedy.70
There are other aspects of coram nobis that are not clear. A
principal reason why coram nobis and other writs were abolished
by federal rule 60 (b) was that the "relief obtained in a particular
case by use of these ancillary remedies [was] shrouded in ancient
lore and mystery." 7 ' Despite the many cases that have been decided
under coram nobis since Morgan, there is still confusion over what
it applies to and when it can be used.72 Under rule 60(b) New
Mexico is free to develop a post-conviction remedy that can truly
complement rule 93, which is also part of the state's rules of civil
procedure-a post-conviction remedy that is based on a modern
statute and not a common law writ.
There is at least one significant difficulty with the New Mexico
approach: Since rule 60(b) applies to both civil and criminal judgments, it is probable that two bodies of case law will develop under
the rule. For example, the broad discovery devices in the civil rules
have generally been held to be inapplicable to a habeas corpus proceeding even though it is civil in nature.7 3 Although New Mexico's
discovery devices apply to rule 60(b) when it is used to attack a
civil judgment, it is likely that they will not be held applicable to an
74
attack under the same rule on a criminal judgment.
With civil rules of procedure 93 and 60 (b), then, New Mexico
seems to have a framework for post-conviction relief that can
69. Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556, 559 (1883),
book of Federal Habeas Corpus § 2 (1965).

as quoted in R. Sokol, A Hand-

70. At least one other writer has advocated the use of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to solve post-conviction remedy problems for the sake of consistency and
simplicity. 2 San Diego L. Rev. 67 (1965).
71. 3A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 488 (Advisory Committee Notes) (1958).
72. See note 65 supra.
73. R. Sokol, A Handbook of Federal Habeas Corpus § 18 (1965).
74. In United States v. Marcello, 202 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. La. 1962), the court
ruled that discovery devices were inapplicable to a coram nobis attack on a criminal
proceeding. Even though rule 60(b) in New Mexico is a civil rule, when it is used as
a post-conviction remedy, the same reasons for refusing to allow the devices in conjunction with a coram nobis attack would apply.
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adequately meet present federal standards. It is suggested that the
state continue to allow rule 93 to attack recidivist sentences and
that the rule be extended to provide relief for one who raises the
motion while in custody but is released from custody before a final
determination on his motion. It is further suggested that if a motion
for post-conviction relief can not be heard under rule 93 and would
have been but for the jurisdictional requirement of custody, the motion be heard under rule 60 (b).
V
CONCLUSION

Because the federal post-conviction statutes and similar statutes
in several of the states are the historical descendants of the ancient
writ of habeas corpus, and because habeas corpus has traditionally
been the remedy for one imprisoned, these statutes limit their relief
to those in custody. The courts have traditionally held that the relief granted must be relief from custody. Morgan and Carafas read
together, however, indicate that the Supreme Court considers the
collateral consequences that survive the serving of a sentence sufficient basis for granting post-conviction relief and that a person
should not be precluded from such relief because he is no longer in
custody when he petitions, regardless of whether he is a state or
federal petitioner.
Because of the jurisdictional bar that prevents habeas corpus
review by the federal courts of a state's failure to grant such relief,
if those desiring to attack state convictions are to receive such relief, it must come from the states themselves.
The State of New Mexico, by designating rule 60(b) of her
rules of civil procedure as a post-conviction remedy has the framework for providing such relief. New Mexico's basic post-conviction
relief statute, complemented by rule 60(b), is adequate to meet
federal standards; this approach may even prove to be superior
to the approach of those jurisdictions which have revived the writ
of coram nobis, and should be considered by the other states in
meeting the challenge of Morgan and Carafas.
C. B. MOYA

